Scott Freeman

Reading C.S.: The Problem of Pain

Back in college I had the occasion to read several of Lewis’ books. My senior year I even took an independent study that focused on three of his works leading to a paper that attempted to synthesize The Problem of Pain, Miracles and A Grief Observed.

I wish I could find that paper and suspect that I could if I looked hard enough. However, I still have the copy I used 18 years ago with my underlinings, highlights, stars and markings throughout.

In reading this 1940 work I realize that I haven’t really picked it up over the last almost two decades. This is the world’s first exposure to Lewis the theologian. And it would contain an apologetic theme that Lewis would continue to come back to.

The core of this book is an attempt to construct an adequate theodicy, the reconciliation of the existence of a loving God with the existence of evil in this world.

What became immediately clear to me as I began to read this work anew is that I no longer held the affinity for it that I did all of those years ago. It did not quite resonate with me as it had as an undergrad.

It’s not that the book is jejune although it does have its spots of tedium. And it’s not that it is poorly written or too elemental. Lewis’ intellect and scholarship are unquestioned. I even agree with his main premise: that God is good. If I did not believe that, I would not believe.

I think the problem exists in a diverging theological path from the one I was on then. At that time I was much more fond of Christian Evidences, believing whole-heartedly that there was an evidentiary magic bullet that would thrust proof into the undeniable spotlight. But I no longer feel that way. The evidence does not always demand a verdict. I share more a view with Kierkegaard that the more probable the evidence for these tenets of faith appear the more improbable they are to believe.

This apathy toward Christian Evidences does not negate the scope of this work. No, ironically, although I don’t have much truck with CE I do feel that grapplings with Theodicy is a worthy and necessary endeavor. For the greatest wrestlings of faith, to me, are those of “why?”

No, I think the problem I have is not in the conclusion that God it is good. It is Lewis’ evasion of other important questions. I repeatedly found myself saying, “yeah, but what about…” throughout his writings.

In his contention that God knows every event there is no reference, even in passing, to the idea of Open Theism. Regardless of it’s validity it’s important enough of a topic that it has to be broached. In addition, I think Lewis falls into the trap that many of us Arminians tend to when we embrace free will: making man’s choice an idol unto itself.

Another tremendous problem I have with the work is the idea that there is no sum of pain, that pain is the same if there is one person suffering as opposed to a million suffering. I disagree. Pain is exponential. Sure, every person matters. As a proponent of a consistent ethic of human life I believe that. But the temptation is to liken my sadness over life’s injustices with those sufferings in the Holocaust or Rwanda. I’d be interested to know if Lewis ever readdressed that idea.

I don’t think that Lewis would make the claim that his conclusions are satisfactory. Instead they invite more questions. Those questions are more profoundly dealt with in his later work, A Grief Observed. Alas, we have 21 years before Lewis will release that journal that truly deals with the problem of pain.

Again, I agree with Lewis in his conclusion that God is good. What that means for us leads me and Lewis to different conclusions. Nowhere is that more evidenced in his chapter on hell. While I would opt for a more nuanced and fleshed out doctrine of hell, Lewis offers up a much more orthodox take. Here, ultimately, is where we diverge.

The Problem of Pain is a worthwhile read. However, I now deem its benefit as understanding a great thinker’s take on the subject rather than a definitive work. Grade: B-